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It is not generally well–known that, in addition to the much–publicized amphibious 
operations around Gallipoli, and the Zeebrugge Raid, the Royal Navy maintained a very 
keen interest in a major attack on the Belgian coast throughout the First World War. The 
classic idea was that of a landing to outflank the virtually static line of the Western Front 
where it met the sea just north of Nieuport. 
 
It has been a constant source of strategic concern to the British that a continental enemy 
should not obtain the possession of the coastlines opposite the United Kingdom, 
particularly those of Belgium and Northern France. This strategic nightmare was realised 
to a large degree in 1914, when the Germans held 27 miles of the Belgian Coast, and then 
completely in 1940. 
   
As soon as static trench warfare developed on the Western Front in 1914, the British 
attempted to nullify the advantages which ownership of the Belgian coast had given to 
the enemy: principally the ability to use the harbours of Zeebrugge and Ostend as bases 
for submarine and destroyer operations. This is where the Dover Patrol enters the story. 
In October 1914, it became apparent that the Belgian Coast would form an increasingly 
important area of operations for the then–established Admiral of Patrols, and on 13 
October, Admiral Horace Hood assumed the Dover Command. In his six months’ tenure, 
Hood conducted at least four bombardments of the coast aimed at damaging the German 
communications close to the sea.  Because of the difficulties of accurate spotting, enemy 
counter fire, and the threat of mines and submarines, most of these bombardments had 
little military value other than to reassure the beleaguered troops ashore that they were 
being supported by the Navy. Hood grew progressively more convinced that the risk to 
his bombarding ships far outweighed any benefits unless the purpose was to support a 
definite Allied advance on land.  
In April 1915, Vice Admiral Sir Reginald  Bacon succeeded Hood in command of the 
Dover Patrol. Bacon’s previous job was that of Managing Director of the Coventry 
Ordnance works, which entailed  working with heavy howitzers in France. It was 
therefore only to be expected that he would have a particular interest in developing means 
of bombarding the German–held coast.  He brought an inexhaustible energy to the task, 
which, combined with his seniority and forceful personality, enabled him to get through a 
prodigious amount of work. 
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Bacon was fortunate that by August 1915, he had available 3 of the new shallow draft 12 
inch gun monitors, the Sir John Moore, the Lord Clive, and the Prince  Rupert. and he 
employed some ingenious solutions for overcoming the existing problems with 
bombardments: to reduce the vulnerability of the force, they would remain under way, 
where previously they had been stopped or anchored. This made them much more 
difficult targets. To improve the accuracy of their guns, Bacon produced two spotting 
platforms, to be deployed from specially adapted dockyard craft: these were five ton 
tripod towers, over 40 feet high, which were lowered into the water until they rested on 
the sea bed. At the top was a deck, clear of the water, big enough for 2 spotters and two 
signallers. Once  lowered, they would be levelled  and their exact position ascertained by 
fixing. From two of  these precisely–placed observation towers, accurate intersecting 
bearings could  be produced for the monitors for spotting fall of shot. Minesweepers  
would  ensure that the vessels only passed through swept water, and the large ships  
would be protected against submarine attack by a huge line of  nets towed by drifters.[1] 
Using these methods, Zeebrugge, Ostend and Westende were all targetted in August and 
September;  however, during these attacks, an unpleasant surprise was revealed in the 
form of the Tirpitz Battery, consisting of  four modern 11 inch guns sited just to the west 
of Ostend, which outranged the British monitors, and  proved distressingly accurate. By 
June and August 1917 respectively, two other long–range batteries had been installed – at 
Knokke, east of Zeebrugge, (The KAISER WILHELM), and east of Ostend (known as 
the DEUTSCHLAND). The risk, therefore to the bombarding vessels became 
increasingly severe, and although there were several other attacks, no terminal damage to 
shore facilities resulted. In fact, the lock gates at Zeebrugge proved so difficult to hit 
from seaward, that they were the object of a separate and daring raid on St George’s Day 
1918. Incidentally, so concerned was Bacon about the Tirpitz Battery, that he landed a 12 
inch long range naval gun (weighing 50 tons) at Dunkirk, moved it and its 50 ton 
specially–adapted mounting by road using low–loader bogies he had himself designed, 
pulled by three large tractors  coupled together to do the towing. The gun was known as 
Dominion, as it was largely installed by Canadian engineers at St Joseph’s Farm near 
Adinkerke. This was about 27,000 yards from the Tirpitz battery, while being outside the 
accurate range of other nearer German guns. It carried out a continual duel against 
Tirpitz, obtaining hits which, however did not result in long–term damage, but rendered 
the harbour at Ostend much more dangerous to use by the enemy. A post–war inspection 
by a US army team revealed that there were innumerable shell holes  around the battery, 
but not one  decent hit.  
 
Bacon had already proposed a landing on the Belgian coast: in late 1915 he sent a memo 
to GHQ France and the Admiralty which set out the possible benefits of a surprise attack 
on Ostend.[2] At the time the main military imperative for such a raid was to render 
Ostend untenable for the minelaying vessels, particularly submarines. If a larger raid 
were to be sanctioned and the port, and the Belgian coast up to it held on a  permanent 
basis, Bacon pointed out that this would remove one great bargaining counter from the 
Germans should a negotiated peace be concluded. The former plan was eventually 
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discarded because of the possible damage to Ostend, which might be required later on for 
our own use, and the latter, because it depended on a  major attack by the Army up the 
coast from Nieuport and Ypres to effect a junction with the landing forces, which was 
just not on the cards at this point of the War. 
 
The Army were not against such a  plan in principle, but General Hunter–Weston, 
appointed by Haig to work with Bacon, with the memory of the Dardanelles still fresh in 
his mind, expressed doubts: the landing forces  would be very vulnerable, notably 
because of the large number of guns the Germans had sited all along the coastline and in 
the harbour of Ostend itself. And so, the project was put in abeyance until circumstance 
became more advantageous to the Allies. 
 
Bacon, however, was not to be shaken from his view that the capture of this vital stretch 
of coast would yield gains disproportionate to the risks, and he set about planning ways to 
overcome the objections inherent in the original proposals. He was keen to  act as early as 
possible, as the Germans were  busily fortifying the area in an attempt to make it 
impregnable by land or sea. For example, along the 27 miles of coastline, there were, at 
the beginning of 1917, more than 80 guns of 6 inch calibre and above. He had already 
discussed his ideas with Haig as early December 1915, who invited him early in 1916 to 
work out plans for a landing and offered support when the military situation was 
favourable. It is of note that, on 18 September, only 3 days after they had first been used 
in action, Haig suggested to Bacon that tanks should form part of the assault force for any 
landing, which those who believe in the 'Donkeys' might ponder. 
 
The Germans were similarly aware of the importance of this region. The permanent 
garrison, under Admiral Schroeder, Commander of the Naval Corps, was two naval 
divisions, to be reinforced in the event of an attack by Army formations. Schroeder was 
no fool, and in June 1917 issued a memorandum to his divisional commanders which 
included the following: 
‘ A landing on a large scale is most unlikely because of the strong armament and 
garrison of the coast, with which the enemy is well acquainted, the great 
difficulties of navigation, and the lack of large fleet transports. The most likely 
operation would be a  flank attack on the land front west of  Westende Bains 
combined with a strong attack from the land side’.[3] 
 
However, a later memorandum, which formed a handover document for Schroeder’s 
relief, dated 31 October 1917, was far more confident in tone. It stated that ‘the landing 
of strong forces of all arms is technically only  possible where there are landing facilities 
on a large scale (such as moles and harbours)’. ie only at Zeebrugge and Ostend. A little 
further on in the same paper, it is stated that ‘As long as the Coastal batteries are not put 
out of action, which would hardly appear to be possible even after a most violent 
bombardment of several day’s duration, the attempt to land strong  land forces is 
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hopeless’. A little further on in the same document is an exhortation that ‘the enemy, who 
is crowded in his boats, must be annihilated before he reaches the beach’. 
Bacon was well aware of the difficulties, and had set his mind to overcoming them, 
particularly Schroeder’s last point. 
 
The first of these problems was, of course, the vital need to land men sufficiently quickly 
to overwhelm the defenders, who we have seen were relatively thinly–spread. Even 
allowing for total surprise over time and place, any landing from small boats and lighters 
was unlikely to provide the initial shock required. It was estimated that the whole force 
would need to be ashore in twenty minutes. Part of the requirement was that tanks would 
form part of the initial assault – a wholly new concept. In a study of over 200 
Amphibious Operations by the UK Centre for Defence Analysis commissioned in 1996 
by the MoD, shows that the ‘presence of tanks in the assault force was significantly 
associated with attack success’. On GOLD Beach on D Day, casualties suffered were 
40% below what might have been expected without tanks in the assault. This serves as a 
rebuttal to those who criticize WW1 leaders of lack of imagination: the first occasion 
when tanks were landed in anger in an amphibious assault was in 1942, 25 years later. 
Bacon’s solution was typical: the men would have to be transported in big lighters, or 
pontoons. These pontoons were to be large enough to carry a column consisting of a full 
brigade of infantry, 3 tanks, four  13pdr guns, two 4.5inch howitzers, a machine gun 
battery mounted on motorcycle sidecars, 8 Stokes carts, 150 hand carts, 2 box cars , 2 
ambulances, and between 183 and 388 pedal cycles depending on the column. The 
pontoons would be secured by chain cables to two 12 inch monitors, lashed close 
alongside each other, who would push the whole contraption forward like a giant nose. 
The pontoon would have a draught which increased from 20 inches forward to 9 feet aft 
(the same as that of the monitors). One was hurriedly built: it  turned out to be 540 feet 
long and 30 feet in width. It was in fact an engineless ship of  over 2,500 tons. Trials with 
monitors were held in conditions of utmost secrecy and showed, however, that the 
scheme was perfectly feasible. 
 
The length of the pontoons was critical: the bow would need to be as close to the sea wall 
as possible, while the stern of the monitors had to be in 14 feet of  water.  Bacon arranged 
for extensive and detailed measurements to be made to discover the exact water depth 
using  a bottomed submarine taking readings every quarter of an hour at  spring and neap 
tides; the slope of the chosen beaches was determined from thousands of aerial 
reconnaissance photographs specially commissioned to show how the water receded as 
the tide ebbed. The results were tested by comparison with an actual survey of a similar 
beach in British hands which confirmed  that the estimate for the selected landing places 
were likely to be accurate to within 6 inches. It was this information which confirmed to 
Bacon the need for long thin lighters, rather than short fat ones, for example. After the 
successful trials of the first pontoon, the other two were ordered in a hurry. In order to 
increase the number of days in a  month that the pontoons could be used, wooden rafts 
were designed: these would  extend the  length of the lighters by about 150 feet, 
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effectively allowing their use in shallower water, but these would only be used if no date 
was available for a landing at the preferred state of tide. As the rafts could not bear the 
weight of a tank, they came equipped with lowerable pillars one foot square with steel 
feet four feet square, which could  be dropped on arrival at the beach and pinned down.  
Experiments proved that this would allow the tanks to land, even at unfavourable tidal 
conditions.  
 
The next problem was to ensure that the that the three pontoons were deposited in exactly 
the right positions. This was effected by a complex process known as the ‘taut wire’ 
method. Basically, the ships and accompanying boats had to have a very accurate idea of 
their distance offshore; to ensure that the monitors with their attached pontoons turned 
together to starboard in the right place. Leading lights were placed  on the Allied–held 
shore which provided an accurate position. From these known positions, small patrol 
boats would drop a small anchor to which was attached a reel of piano wire. Keeping the 
wire taut meant that the exact distance from the known position could be continuously 
read. At the points where the monitors needed to turn, buoys would be laid by these small 
boats. So precise was the system, that it had been proved possible for a line of such 
markers to be  laid almost up to  the water’s edge. 
 
Having confidence  that the landing could be made in the strength necessary and at the 
intended places, a method had to be found to get the tanks over the sea wall. The chosen 
positions for the landings had now been fixed along the stretch of coastline from 
Middlekerke to Westende les Bains, with the columns about a  mile apart. This location 
had been chosen despite the fact that there was a twenty foot sea wall, sloping at about 30 
degrees, and capped by a  formidable coping which overhung the wall by three feet. In 
terms reminiscent of Blackadder, Bacon reports that the area “seemed so impossible that 
it would  not be expected by the Germans, and therefore would probably be easier than a  
landing in an apparently more favourable locality”.[4] There was, of course more to it:  it 
was thought that a landing further up the coast, ie nearer Ostend, might prove too far for 
the main attack, advancing from Nieuport, to effect a  junction with the raiders.  Also, 
this part of the coast, although heavily fortified, relied on large numbers of enfilading 
machine guns sited in strongpoints to destroy any landing on the beaches. There were few 
coastal batteries in this section; nor were there the same number of second line  trenches 
and strengthened positions, running parallel to the shoreline as in the other areas held by 
the German Marines, notably around Ostend and Zeebrugge. The operation, if successful, 
would  not give staggering gains: the line  would only be advanced a maximum of four 
and a half miles. But It was considered that even  this small gain would be sufficient to 
render Ostend untenable as a harbour, and move our guns close enough to neutralise the 
large batteries around that port. Bacon and Rawlinson, Commander of the Fourth Army, 
with whom he was now in regular  contact, calculated that the Germans north of Ypres 
would  find themselves in an untenable position, and a general withdrawal would be 
forced on them. So the prize was definitely worth the risk. 
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It was now possible for the amphibious parties to be landed quickly, and at the right 
place, but two more difficulties required resolution: how to minimize the danger from the 
larger German batteries, and how to get the tanks over the steep and overhanging 
concrete sea wall. To overcome the first problem, no fewer than 80 motor launches, 
divided into  4 flotillas and 8 divisions  would  lay a huge curtain of  phosphorus smoke 
immediately the monitors turned towards the landing  sites. Various orders were prepared 
to cope with different possibilities of wind direction, and the decision on which to use 
would only be made at the last minute. Thus obscured by smoke, the monitors would 
have enough time to land  their troop and withdraw, before visibility was restored to 
enable the German batteries to have a reasonable chance of accurate shooting. At the 
same time, these same batteries would be under fire from three 15 inch monitors, Soult 
who would be taking care of the more distant batteries, while Erebus and Terror made life 
unpleasant for the many guns around Raversyde, just to the north of the landings. 
 
Additional support would be provided by the guns of five smaller monitors, numbers M 
23 to 27 , fitted with 9.2 inch guns, which would open fire when the pontoons were half a 
mile from shore, and from the pushing monitors – firing  themselves when the lighters 
grounded with reduced charges. Combined with a major attack by the BEF on the land 
front,  by these means it was confidently predicted that the enemy guns  would be 
satisfactorily neutralised, and that the strong points on the shore and the electric fence 
which ran the whole length of the Belgian coast would be destroyed. Any surviving 
machine  guns would  be accounted for by the tanks, once they had surmounted the sea 
wall. 
 
To achieve this, an exact replica of the sea wall was built at the Tank Headquarters in 
France, and after exhaustive trials, it was found that it was possible for the tanks to carry 
an inclined platform, which each vehicle would drop before the wall and use to climb 
over the parapet. It was absolutely vital that these arrangements worked: the tanks would 
be first off and they were crucial to the infantry’s advance. 
 
The prevention of attack by German light forces was delegated to the Harwich Flotilla,  
reinforced by the units of the 6th Flotilla not otherwise employed in the operation. 
All the apparent problems  having been shown to be able to be overcome, all that 
remained  was to plan the details of the operation, and await the expected advance of the 
Army past Roulers as a result of the Ypres campaign. By 25 May,  Rawlinson and Bacon 
had decided that 8 August would  be  the best date for the operation, as there would  be 
no moon and favourable tides. The ten days either side would  also be acceptable if the 
weather or military situation prevented the operation taking  place on the optimum date. 1 
June, Rawlinson was convinced that the scheme could work. 
 
The first requirement was that of absolute secrecy: the operation could not succeed 
without the element of surprise.  Throughout June the monitors practised with the barges 
in the Swin estuary just off the Thames. All evolutions were conducted at night or during 
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cloudy weather to ensure they were not observed by aircraft, and on completion the 
pontoons and the monitors were moored apart so that they could not be associated with 
each other. The ships’ companies of the monitors and other vessels participating in the 
landing were confined to their ships, and the 1st Division, chosen by Rawlinson to be the 
assault formation, was likewise sequestered in an isolated camp at Le Clipon, a few miles 
down  the coast from Nieuport, where they began intensive training in complete secrecy 
on 16 July. Rumours were leaked that they had been quarantined for a  serious medical 
problem. There was no leave, of course. No–one outside the camp had any dealings with 
those inside: even the stores were transferred without the receivers meeting those 
delivering them. The camp was guarded and patrolled, and the strictest censorship was 
undertaken, and all the troops inside the wire had it made clear to them that their lives 
and those of their comrades depended on absolute secrecy. 
 
The training of 1st Division was based on the vital necessity for surprise, and a model of 
the sea wall at the landing areas was built: the soldiers at first struggled to climb the 30 
degree slope without full kit, but after training, they were completely at home on the 
incline, even in battle order and carrying bicycles and ammunition. The heavier 
equipments, guns etc, would be hauled up the sea wall using winches fitted to one of the 
tanks. In view of the limited space available, and the need for the force to be independent 
of outside assistance for at least 48 hours, the landing parties were to be comprised of:  
 
All the infantry, including the trench mortar batteries, but no horsed transport. 
An artillery battery of 4 – 18pdrs and 2 – 4.5 howitzers plus 6 ammunition 
wagons – all with limbers, per brigade 
One Field Company plus One Pioneer Company for each landing 
Cyclists for each landing, a full battalion on the left, 3 companies in the centre, 
and 1 company on the right. 
One motor MG battery per landing 
A medical section with 2 motor ambulances per landing 
Hand carts 
3 Tanks,  2 Male, 1 Female, which would be the rearmost of the 3. 
Over 15000 men would be landed together 
 
For practising loading, full size plans of the monitors and models of the pontoons were 
set up at Le Clipon, and the best arrangement decided upon [vufoil]. The troops then 
practised the disembarkation procedures until remarkable improvements were noted: 
eventually, each Brigade Group was able to clear the pontoons and land within 10 
minutes, well within the 20 minutes proposed at the start by Bacon. 
The troops were also trained in new tactics for the operation. Very few had any 
experience of anything other than trench warfare, and the landing would require 
proficiency in open warfare. The troops proved eager learners and improved enormously. 
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A special  team was trained for a particular mission: to destroy the guns of the Raversyde 
Battery, 4–6in guns situated between Ostend and Middlekerke. [point out on map]. If this 
battery remained in operation for any length of time, it could on its own deny the 
operation success. Therefore, a flying column would be despatched as  soon as possible 
after the landing, consisting of a battalion of cyclists, a motor machine gun battery, and a 
detachment of a Field Company, also on bikes. They would rush the guns from landward, 
destroy the guns, and withdraw. Much experimentation was undertaken to determine the 
best and most economical way to render the guns useless. 
 
Finally, special communication arrangements were made so that a telephone line would 
be run from the Fourth Army HQ behind Nieuport to the Divisional HQ by a monitor. 
Each of the Brigade Groups would also have telephone lines run out from a buoy at sea 
by the monitors pushing the pontoons, to be connected up subsequently. Thus it was 
hoped that relatively secure submarine communications between Army HQ, Divisional 
and Brigade HQs would be achieved.  
 
The landing would be supported by a major attack by XV Corps from Nieuport, 
notwithstanding the fact that the Germans had launched a surprise and pre–emptive attack 
on the 1st Division holding the positions north of the Yser. The division had only just 
taken over the line from the French, who had operated a policy of live and let live with 
their opponents. A cursory glance at the map will show, however, that any troops north of 
the river would  be immediately and completely cut off if the three bridges were 
destroyed. In the event this happened on 10 July, when the Germans began a 
bombardment at about 0900 which lasted all day. At 2000 they attacked with infantry and 
storm–troops, outnumbering the British defenders 3 to 1. By 2020 they were on the river 
bank. Of the two full battalions – the 2/KRRC and the 1/Northamptons holding the 
positions, only 4 officers and 55  men managed to swim across to British lines. As early 
as 15th July the AG reported that the 2  destroyed battalions could be easily reconstituted, 
and therefore this setback would  not interrupt planning for the landing and on 16th, the 1st 
Division was withdrawn for training for its part in the landing. Haig’s diary noted that his 
troops in this previously quiet area had suffered 10,000 casualties since taking over the 
part of the front from the French. (26th July entry) 
 
Haig took a deep personal interest in the planning. We have already seen that it was the 
Commander in Chief who had first suggested the  use of tanks in the assault, and in  the 
months preceding the proposed landing, he kept a very close eye on proceedings: after 
the German attack  of 10 July he urged caution on Rawlinson not to attack until he had 
sufficient artillery dominance. On  the 16th July, the day that the 1st Division began its 
training, Haig attended a demonstration of the tank assaults at the testing grounds, where 
he noted with satisfaction that  they could scale a sea wall over 20 ft high with an 
overhanging lip. On 21st Haig laid down 3  conditions for the landing to go ahead: 
 
-                     if the enemy were in disorder 
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-                     if the enemy coastal divisions had been diverted to the main battle front, 
or were  otherwise used  up, and, 
-                     if  the advance from the Clerken/Staden Ridge was going well. 
 
His diary shows that he remained very cautious, and was pre–occupied with the need for 
artillery supremacy for the land offensive. 
 
Rawlinson learned on 25 July that the proposed attack at Ypres would not begin until 31 
July, which meant that any advance would be unlikely to have been sufficient for the 
landing operation to go ahead on the originally intended date. He and Bacon therefore 
decided on a later date for their assault, either 24 August or 6 September.  On 13th 
August, Du Cane, GOC of  XV Corps tried to convince Rawlinson and Haig that the 
landing should precede his attack, and was given short shrift by the CinC, who visited the 
training camp at Le Clipon  the following day, and expressed great satisfaction at the 
morale and efficiency of the troops preparing for the landings. On 22nd  August, Haig told 
Bacon and Rawlinson that the main effort by Fifth Army was not sufficiently advanced 
for the  6th September date  to be met, and he ordered a further postponement, but he told 
them to continue preparations. 
 
As we now  know, progress around Ypres was nothing like as rapid as had been hoped, 
and it  became apparent after the 1st Battle of Passchendaele that the situation was not 
going  to be favourable, and on 15 October the 1st Division was moved from its camp at 
Le Clipon, and the operation formally cancelled for that year. 
  
The preliminary programme had as its main aim the avoidance of premature detection by 
the enemy. The following possible account of the eventual landing has been compiled 
from the accounts of Bacon and Dobbie, a Staff Officer of the 1st Division, and may or 
may not be optimistic. 
 
The first problem was to get the lighters and monitors across to Dunkirk. They would be 
towed by the monitors over two nights: on the first night they would be taken from the 
Swin to Trinity Bay, on the Goodwin Sands, where they would lie innocently during the 
hours of daylight. If spotted by the enemy, it was hoped that they would be ignored as 
being a new part of the South Coast defences. The following  night the pontoons would 
complete their journey to Dunkirk, where they would be berthed out of view from nosy 
eyes. Loading of the equipment would take place over two consecutive nights at the 
RNAS seaplane base, and the pontoons returned to their lonely berths. At dusk the 
following evening the pontoons would be moved to the buoys one mile apart where they 
would be attached  to the monitors, who meanwhile were lashing themselves together and 
embarking the troops, which they would put into the lighters when connected up. All this 
would take place under a strong air patrol to prevent observation by enemy aircraft. The 
four Flotillas of escorting smoke boats would be massed at Dunkirk only that night. The 
Harwich Flotilla of destroyers protecting the landing would be sailed. 
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By 2200 the monitors would be connected, and would then slip and proceed. 
Immediately, the escorting vessels would  take station: the destroyers on the seaward 
bow, the smoke boats on the landward  side, the escorting small monitors, and the small 
boats carrying the taut wire distance measuring gear. Before the leading  lights came into 
line they would drop their anchors for the taut wires to be zeroed when the lights aligned. 
At the appropriate distance the monitors would turn to starboard using wheel and engine 
revolution orders tested many times and head for shore about 1 mile apart. As they 
turned, the monitors Soult, Erebus, and Terror would engage the Raversyde Battery and 
the others east of Ostend, and the smoke boats would begin there work.. Half a mile from 
the shore the accompanying small M. monitors would open fire. Continuous soundings 
would be taken of the water depth from the bows of the pontoons, and as soon as 8ft was 
reported, the engines of the monitors were to be put into reverse, the tank engines started, 
and the pontoons gently grounded. As the first 400 troops rushed ashore with the tanks, 
the 12 and 6 inch guns of the monitors would open fire with reduces charges, blasting the 
coastal defences. The tanks would reach the wall, deploy their special inclined wedges 
and scale the wall quickly. Once over, the first two, accompanied by an ever–swelling 
tide of infantry would destroy troublesome machine gun posts and wire, while the third 
would haul the guns and other heavy equipment over the sea wall before adding its 
weight to the assault. Every man in the attacking force had seen a map and model of his 
area, and every section had an allotted task.  The telephone lines would be laid, and as 
soon as  possible  the troops of the left hand  brigade despatched as a flying column in 
their well–rehearsed mission to destroy the guns at Raversyde, which had no landward 
defences, and rout their astonished crews.  
 
After a few hours of intensive fighting, all the objectives would be achieved,  the German 
defenders overwhelmed, and a junction made with the  troops of XV Corps attacking 
from the Nieuport area. During the following  night, every effort would have been made 
to land extra  stores and transport to consolidate the position. German counter attacks 
would have been hampered by the marshy ground and the loss in the assault of much of 
his mobile  rtillery. Bacon planned to install 2 or 3 of the new 18 inch guns in the Palace 
Hotel at the newly–captured Westende. Ostend would have been brought to within 
smaller calibre gun range and made untenable as an operating base for submarines and 
smaller craft, and might well have been abandoned by the Germans, in which case 
Zeebrugge would  quickly have been rendered unusable. Practically the whole of the 
Belgian coastline would either be in our hands or under our guns. 
 
Throughout, Haig had been a strong  supporter of the idea of an amphibious assault, if the 
military situation warranted it. His circumspection counterbalanced the optimism of 
Rawlinson and Bacon who were both confident that the possible gain was worth the risk.  
In addition,  Jellicoe, who  during the planning had been notable for his caution, was 
convinced that the  plan would  have succeeded. Others were  not so sure: after the war 
Gough looked at the plan and visited the landing areas. He was convinced that it was 
lucky that the operation never  took place. Bacon’s successor, the able Roger Keyes, also 
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reached the conclusion that the attacking  division would have been annihilated, but then 
one should remember that Keyes thought that the Dardanelles operation was feasible.  
This operation, notwithstanding the fact that it never actually took place, provides, I 
believe, an excellent example of how far the Royal Navy and the British Army had 
advanced in its practises in a relatively short time. Conceived before the Battles of the 
Somme,  it can be seen that great imagination had been applied to the planning, and every 
effort made to learn the lessons of the past. In particular, the problems of assaulting an 
enemy–held shore were given much consideration: surprise, secrecy, overwhelming local 
firepower, specific training for the attack units, close cooperation between the services, 
the use of tanks, – all illustrate that, given the right circumstances, and the time to plan, 
British military leadership was as able as any in devising daring and manouevrist as any. 
The objectives may not have been as grand  or grandiose as the  Dardanelles adventure, 
but they were far more likely of achievement at much less cost.  
    
There is no doubt that the landing would have been a huge gamble, but the most that 
could have been lost was  one  division of the BEF and some obsolete monitors: on the 
basis that the Third  Ypres  campaign eventually cost about 350,000 British casualties, a 
further 15000 or  so – in the worst case – would seem a reasonable risk for the enormous 
potential gains. 
  
 
[1] The main sources for those measures are The Naval Staff Monograph (Historical) 
Volume VI on the Dover Command, written by the Historical Section of the  Training 
and Staff Duties Division of the Naval  Staff, and  published for internal use in 1922. 
Originally  allocated the Confidential Book Number CB 917 (D), it is available in the 
Public Record Office. This monograph, however, admits that many of the original 
documents are ‘not  forthcoming’, and much of the information is therefore based  on 
Admiral Bacon’s books, The Dover Patrol 1915–1917, Two  volumes, published by 
Hutchinson and Co, in 1919, and The Concise History of the Dover Patrol, published by 
Hutchinson and Co in 1932. The latter work was produced by Bacon partly to correct ‘the 
inaccuracies and omissions of the Admiralty Departmental account of the work of the 
Patrol during my command’. These inaccuracies are not significant in the account of The 
Great Landing, probably because the Official account was based on Bacon’s first book.  
 
 
[2] This memorandum did not come to light during the compilation of the Admiralty 
account, but it is clear that it had existed, as references had been made to it in other 
documents 
 
 
[3] After the War, a joint Naval, Military and Air Force Committee was appointed to 
Examine the German Defences on the Belgian Coast. A highly comprehensive report was 
produced in 1919 as CB 1524, including translations of captured German documents. 
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[4] Bacon. op.cit., 228 
 
 
